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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE
MERCOSUR - Is HARMONISATION
THE SOLUTION?
Nigel Blackaby and Sylvia Noury*
I. INTRODUCTION
LATIN America has become a fashionable topic in arbitration cir-
cles. In the last six months, conferences in Miami, Dallas, and
Paris have all focused on the subject of arbitration in Latin
America. Ten years ago there would have been little to talk about at such
a conference. Arbitrations involving parties from the region have risen
by a factor of five before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
since the 1980s. At the close of the last century, more arbitrations in-
volved Latin American parties than Africa, Central and Eastern Europe
combined. So, what happened?
In short, the region's often fledgling democracies embraced free mar-
ket economics and sought to attract foreign direct investment to assist in
the upgrade of their public services infrastructure in sectors such as gas,
water, roads, and power projects. This upgrade occurred through
privatisation and joint ventures with foreign participation. Inevitably,
such investors were not prepared to trust the local court systems with
their multimillion-dollar investments and, consequently, required the in-
corporation of arbitration clauses.
Latin American states have historically rejected arbitration due to the
suspicion that it placed in doubt the sovereign right of each state to re-
solve disputes involving investments in its territory before its national
courts. This philosophy is known as the "Calvo Doctrine," named after
the famous Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo. The MERCOSUR states were
no exception. By the creation of MERCOSUR,1 however, Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (the "Member States"), as well as Bolivia
Nigel Blackaby is a partner in the International Arbitration Group of Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer's Paris office, and is the head of the firm's Latin American
Dispute Resolution Group. Sylvia Noury is an associate in the International Arbi-
tration Group of the firm's New York office.
1. In March 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Member States) signed
the Treaty of Asunci6n, establishing a free trade area in the Southern Cone of
Latin America known as the Mercado Comdn del Cono Sur (MERCOSUR). In
1996, Bolivia and Chile (Associate States) entered into agreements of association
with the MERCOSUR. More recently, Venezuela filed an application to do the
same. Treaty of Asunci6n, Mar. 26, 1991, available at http://www.itcilo.it (last vis-
ited July 16, 2003).
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and Chile (the "Associate States") were realizing the limitations of this
doctrine and tentatively adopting more investor-friendly solutions on an
individual level. A few years later, given the different pace of these de-
velopments, these states collectively made it their goal to implement
harmonised, modem, and effective international commercial and inves-
tor-state arbitration mechanisms under the umbrella of MERCOSUR to
resolve disputes arising from investments made in the region.
Although several of these MERCOSUR mechanisms remain unimple-
mented, Brazil's ratification of the MERCOSUR International Commer-
cial Arbitration Agreement (MAA) on June 5, 2003 (which agreement
shall enter into force in respect of Argentina and Brazil on July 5, 2003),
together with Argentina's recent advances in the enactment of a modern
new arbitration law, put international arbitration in MERCOSUR
squarely into the forefront of key legal issues in the region.
Part II of this article explores the ambitions behind MERCOSUR's at-
tempts to harmonise arbitration mechanisms in the region in light of the
individual laws and conventions already in force in the Member and As-
sociate States. Part III focuses on Argentina and Brazil. Finally, the
Conclusions seek to provide a response to the question: "Is harmonisa-
tion the solution?"
II. THE AMBITIONS OF THE MERCOSUR
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The arbitration-related ambitions of MERCOSUR can be split into
two strands: (a) the harmonisation of international commercial arbitra-
tion within MERCOSUR (under the MAA); and (b) the establishment of
effective mechanisms by means of which foreign investors can arbitrate
claims against MERCOSUR Member States (under the Colonia and
Buenos Aires Protocols to MERCOSUR).
A. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
IN THE MERCOSUR
1. The Creation of the MAA
On July 23, 1998, the Member States entered into an agreement estab-
lishing a set of common rules to govern international commercial arbitra-
tion proceedings relating to MERCOSUR. On the same day
MERCOSUR entered into an almost identical agreement with Chile and
Bolivia. Collectively, these agreements are known as the MAA. The
stated purpose of the MAA is that of "regulating arbitration as a private
alternative method of dispute resolution, arising out of international com-
mercial contracts between private corporations or individuals." '2
The agreement between the Member States shall enter into force with
respect to Argentina and Brazil on July 5, 2003, which is thirty days after
2. MERCOSUR International Commercial Arbitration Agreement, art. 1 [hereinaf-
ter MAA].
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ratification by Brazil on June 5, 2003 (Argentina having previously rati-
fied the agreement).3 The agreement is not yet in force with respect to
Paraguay or Uruguay. The agreement between MERCOSUR and the
Associate States will come into force when it is ratified by either Chile or
Bolivia.
2. Influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law
The MAA derived much inspiration from the Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law in 1985 (UNCITRAL Model Law),4 as is
acknowledged in the preamble. Further, the MAA explicitly provides
that the principles and rules of the UNCITRAL Model Law shall supple-
ment the MAA where the latter, or the procedural rules and conventions
and norms referred to in the latter, are silent.5 This is noteworthy, given
that at the time the MAA was drafted, none of the Member or Associate
States had adopted the UNICITRAL Model Law in their domestic arbi-
tration laws.
3. Other Arbitration Conventions Referred to in the MAA
In addition to the UNCITRAL Model Law, the MAA refers to the
following rules and conventions:
* The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Ar-
bitration of 1975 (Panama Convention), which currently binds the
four Member States and Chile (excluding Bolivia). This conven-
tion is a regional reflection of another more global arbitration con-
vention: the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention),
signed in 1958 and now in force in over 130 states worldwide. Like
the New York Convention, the Panama Convention is mainly de-
voted to the direct enforceability of arbitration agreements and to
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Addi-
tionally, the Panama Convention requires the automatic applica-
tion to any arbitration agreement falling within its scope (unless
the parties state otherwise) of the arbitral rules established by the
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC),
3. The agreement was ratified in Brazil by means of Decree No. 4719/2003, published
on June 5, 2003. Article 26(1) of the agreement states that "this Agreement shall
enter into force, with respect to the two first State Parties to ratify it, thirty (30)
days after the second country deposits its instrument of ratification." MAA, supra
note 2, art. 26(1).
4. The idea behind the UNCITRAL Model Law was to promote a text that any coun-
try could adopt with minimal changes. The initiative was spearheaded by the lead-
ing practitioners and users of international arbitration, and produced a coherent
model well adapted to the needs of international commerce. See UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, June 21, 1985, available at
http://www.jus.uio.no [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
5. MAA, supra note 2, art. 25(3).
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which are based on the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration. 6
" The Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of
Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards (Montevideo Conven-
tion) has been ratified by the Member States, but not by either of
the Associate States. This convention is only of subsidiary applica-
tion to the Panama Convention.7 Its practical importance is there-
fore virtually confined to recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards on civil and labour matters.
" The Las Lefias Protocol on Cooperation and Judicial Assistance in
Civil, Commercial, Labour and Administrative Matters of 1992
(Las Lefias Protocol) has been signed and ratified by all four
Member States. 8 This is a MERCOSUR instrument on interna-
tional judicial cooperation to facilitate the enforcement of foreign
court judgments rendered in the Member States, but its scope was
extended to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.9
Unfortunately, the MAA refers to these three instruments, particularly
in the context of the recognition and enforcement of the award, without
stating an order of preference in their applicability. The resulting overlap
of applicable rules is addressed further below.
4. Content of the MAA
The content of the MAA loosely follows that of the UNCITRAL
Model Law, but with a number of regional modifications. The following
is a very brief overview of the most important provisions of the MAA.10
a. Scope of Application
The MAA applies to "international arbitration," which is defined as
the "private means for the resolution of disputes relating to international
commercial contracts between private parties.""
Article 3 of the MAA sets out a list of five instances in which the MAA
would apply to a particular international arbitration. Sections (d) and (e)
require that the parties expressly agree on the application of the MAA.12
Section (c) requires the base contract to have "an objective and legal or
6. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30,
1975, art. 3, available at http://www.asser.nl/ica/iaci.htm [hereinafter Panama Con-
vention]. The IACAC recently amended its procedural rules of arbitration; the
new rules came into force on April 1, 2002.
7. Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and
Arbitral Awards, Aug. 5, 1979, art. 1, available at httpJ/www.ftaa-alca.org [herein-
after Montevideo Convention].
8. The Las Lefias Protocol is not applicable to Bolivia and Chile as they are not
MERCOSUR Member States. Las Lefias Protocol on Cooperation and Judicial
Assistance on Civil, Commercial, Labour, and Administrative Matters (1992),
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsrs/decisions/DEC592.asp [hereinaf-
ter Las Leflas Protocol].
9. Id. art. 20(e).
10. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, Ch. 10 (Nigel Blackaby et
al. eds., 2002), for a more detailed review of the provisions of the MAA.
11. MAA, supra note 2, art. 2(b).
12. Id. art. 3(d), (e).
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economic contact" with, and the seat of the arbitration to be in, a Mem-
ber or Associate State and no agreement to the contrary by the parties.13
Sections (a) and (b) are more controversial, in that they provide that the
MAA will apply simply if: (a) the arbitration agreement is concluded be-
tween persons domiciled in different Member or Associate States; or (b)
the base contract has "an objective or economic contact" with more than
one Member or Associate State.14 If read at face value, this would lead
to difficulties in a case where the parties fulfill condition (a) and/or (b),
but have chosen a seat of arbitration outside MERCOSUR. Conse-
quently, (a) and (b) should be interpreted in accordance with the princi-
ple that the MAA cannot apply to cases where the parties have agreed to
a seat outside the Member or Associate States, unless they have expressly
agreed that the MAA is applicable.
b. The Arbitration Agreement
Article 2(e) of the MAA defines the "arbitral agreement" (convenci6n
arbitral) as "the agreement whereby the parties decide to submit to arbi-
tration all or some of the disputes which have arisen or which may arise
out of contractual relationships between them," and adds that "the arbi-
tration agreement can be found in a clause contained in a contract or in a
separate agreement."'1 5 This provision eliminates from the MAA the an-
tiquated two-stage process envisaged by the national arbitration laws of
some of the Member and Associate States. These laws provide that the
mere inclusion of an arbitration clause in the contract is not enough; the
parties are also required to enter into a specific agreement, known as a
compromiso, once the dispute has arisen in order to submit the dispute to
arbitration.' 6
Pursuant to article 4 of the MAA, the arbitration agreement shall be
made in good faith, provide equitable treatment to the parties, and be
reasonably easy to identify in the contract. Article 6 specifies the formali-
ties with which the agreement should comply; for example, it shall be in
writing. Article 5 provides for the autonomy of the arbitration agreement
from the main contract, which means that the invalidity of the main con-
tract will not imply the nullity of the arbitration agreement. The MAA
further provides that the law governing the validity of the arbitration
agreement is that of the Member or Associate State where the arbitral
tribunal is seated and that the tribunal is competent to rule on the exis-
tence or validity of this agreement.' 7
13. Id. art. 3(c).
14. Id. art. 3(a), (b).
15. Id. art. 2(e).
16. Not surprisingly, the compromiso has been heavily criticised and, with very few
exceptions, eliminated from modern national laws on arbitration. See Horacio A.
Grigera Na6n, Arbitration in Latin America: Overcoming Traditional Hostility (An
Update), 22 U. MIAMI IN ER-AM. L. REv. 203 (1991).
17. MAA, supra note 2, arts. 7(b), 8.
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c. The Applicable Law
Pursuant to article 10 of the MAA, the parties (or in the absence of
agreement between the parties, the arbitrators) may choose the law appli-
cable to the dispute on the basis of "private international law and its prin-
ciples, as well as the law of international trade."' 18 This would arguably
put restrictions on the parties' freedom to choose the applicable law. 19
Perhaps for this reason, in its instrument of ratification, Brazil clarified
that article 10 was to be interpreted so as to permit the parties to choose
the applicable law freely, provided that the chosen law respects interna-
tional public order (ordem ptiblica internacional).20
d. The Arbitral Tribunal
In articles 16 and 17, the MAA provides for the appointment, chal-
lenge, and replacement of the arbitrators. In institutional arbitrations,
such matters are governed by the relevant institutional rules. However,
in ad hoc arbitrations, the MAA provides that (unless the parties agree
otherwise) the appointment, challenge, and replacement of arbitrators
are governed by the IACAC rules. Pursuant to the new IACAC rules,
decisions on the appointment and replacement of arbitrators are now
made by the IACAC Arbitrator Nominating Committee. 2' Parties to an
arbitration governed by the MAA no longer have to resort to the na-
tional courts in such matters, as they previously would have under the
UNCITRAL Model Law.
e. The Conduct of the Proceedings
The MAA governs most aspects of the arbitral procedure with only
slight variations from the procedure set forth in the UNCITRAL Model
Law. In addition, procedural aspects not explicitly regulated by the
MAA, the Panama Convention or the other conventions and norms re-
ferred to in the MAA will be regulated by the UNCITRAL Model Law
in accordance with article 25(3). Variations from the UNCITRAL Model
Law relating to the conduct of the proceedings include:
" In the absence of procedural rules agreed by the parties, the IA-
CAC rules are applicable (art. 12(2)(b));
" If the seat of the arbitration is not chosen by the parties, the tribu-
nal must designate one of the Member of Associate States as the
seat (art. 13(1));
18. Id. art. 10.
19. UNC1TRAL Model Law, supra note 4, art. 28.
20. See Decree 4719/2003, supra note 3. The authors would like to thank Giovanni
Ettore Nanni of Tozzini Freire Teixeira e Silva Advogados for his insight into the
process of ratification of the MAA in Brazil.
21. Cf. Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission Rules of Procedure, arts.
5, 7-10, available at http://www.sice.oas.orgl/DISPUTE/comarb/iacactrop-e.asp
(last visited Aug. 4, 2003) [hereinafter IACAC Rules of Procedure]. The Arbitra-
tor Nominating Committee is comprised of the President, the Director General,
and two members of the Executive Committee of the IACAC.
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" If the language of the arbitration is not chosen by the parties, it
will be the language of the seat of the arbitration (art. 13(2));
" The provisions of the MAA regulating the commencement of arbi-
tration proceedings are more detailed than those of the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law (art. 15);
" Although objections to jurisdiction are addressed in article 18,
there is no provision empowering the parties to apply to national
courts to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal;22 and
" The provisions of the MAA addressing the granting of interim
measures by arbitrators and national courts are more cumbersome
and complicated than those of the UNCITRAL Model Law (art.
19).
f. The Arbitral Award
The final award shall be made in writing and shall settle all matters
submitted to the tribunal.23 The award may record a settlement agree-
ment reached by the parties, if such request is made to the arbitral tribu-
nal.24 Pursuant to article 20(1), the award is final and binding on the
parties, except for the recourses found in articles 21 and 22.
g. Recourse against the Arbitral Award
Under sections 21 and 22 of the MAA, an arbitral award is subject only
to the recourses of rectification and interpretation before the same arbi-
tral tribunal and setting aside before the national courts of the seat of the
arbitration. The award is not subject to appeal before national courts on
the merits.
The grounds for an application for setting aside under article 22 are
similar to those contemplated by the UNCITRAL Model Law, although
some differences exist. For example, the lack of capacity of one of the
parties and the lack of proper notification of the appointment of an arbi-
trator are not expressly contemplated by the MAA, but they should be
deemed to be included in the grounds of "breach of the principles of due
process."'25 Further, unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law, the MAA does
not expressly contemplate as a ground for setting aside that the subject
matter of the dispute is incapable of being settled by arbitration or that
the award is contrary to public policy. It is likely, however, that such
grounds would be considered in national courts.
h. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
In dealing with the enforcement of foreign awards, article 23 of the
MAA refers to the Panama Convention, the Las Lefias Protocol, and the
22. Cf. UNC1TRAL Model Law, supra note 4, art. 16(3) (allowing the parties to file
an appeal before a local court against a tribunal's preliminary ruling on its own
jurisdiction).
23. MAA, supra note 2, art. 20(1), (4)(c).
24. Id. art. 20(7).
25. Id. art. 22(2)(d).
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Montevideo Convention.26 Unfortunately, this provision does not pro-
vide an order of preference in the application of these three conventions.
Although the Montevideo Convention provides that it is of subsidiary
application to the Panama Convention, the Las Lefias Protocol states that
it does not exclude the application of other conventions on the same sub-
ject in force between the signatory states "provided they do not contra-
dict it."'27 This might amount to a preference for the Las Lefias Protocol
over both the Panama Convention and the New York Convention, which
is now in force in all Member and Associate States (Brazil ratified the
New York Convention in July 2002). This preference is a potential cause
for concern given that, unlike the other two conventions, for recognition
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards the Las Lefias Protocol re-
quires the intervention of both the judiciary of the state in which the
award was made and the judiciary of the state in which enforcement is
sought. The Protocol requires that the award must have attained res judi-
cata in the state where it was rendered, which in practice constitutes the
requirement of double exequatur.28
5. Ambitions of the MAA
The conclusion of the MAA was an ambitious attempt to modernise
and harmonise the differing arbitration systems of the Member and Asso-
ciate States by way of the establishment of a common "international arbi-
tration law."'29 The agreements, which seek to "internationalise" (i) the
arbitral procedure, (ii) arbitral tribunals and their interaction with state
courts, and (iii) the eventual recognition and enforcement of awards,
were intended to send a message to foreign investors that arbitration in
MERCOSUR will be conducted in accordance with the same modem in-
ternational regime irrespective of the arbitral seat selected. The MAA is
now entering into force in Argentina and Brazil. How this agreement will
interact with the arbitration mechanisms already in force in those two
countries is discussed in Part III.
B. INVESTOR-STATE AprrRATiON IN THE MERCOSUR
1. Creation of the Colonia Protocol and the Buenos Aires Protocol
Prior to an attempt to harmonise international commercial arbitration
in the region, the MERCOSUR Member States embarked upon another
26. No doubt reference to the New York Convention was omitted because, at the time
of drafting, Brazil was not a signatory state. Brazil ratified the New York Conven-
tion in July 2002.
27. Montevideo Convention, supra note 7, art. 1; Las Lefias Protocol, supra note 8, art.
35.
28. Las Leflas Protocol, supra note 8, art. 20(e). Chile and Bolivia seem to be in better
positions because the Las Lefias Protocol does not apply to them as Associate
States.
29. The preamble of the MAA states that the parties are "convinced of the need to
standardise the organization and functioning of international arbitration among
the State Parties to contribute to the expansion of regional and international
trade." MAA, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
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ambitious investor-friendly initiative: the establishment of protocols in-
tended to "promote and protect" foreign investment in the region. Two
protocols were signed: (i) the Colonia Protocol on Reciprocal Promotions
of Investments within MERCOSUR (Colonia Protocol),30 and (ii) the
Buenos Aires Protocol on Protection of Foreign Investments from Non-
Parties to MERCOSUL (Buenos Aires Protocol). 31 As their names indi-
cate, the Colonia Protocol protects investors from a Member State in the
territory of another Member State, and the Buenos Aires Protocol pro-
tects investors from non-Member States in the territory of a Member
State.32
Neither Protocol is yet in force. Further, only the standards of the
Colonia Protocol are intended to be of immediate application once the
Protocol enters into force. The standards of the Buenos Aires Protocol
are intended merely to establish a substantive framework within which
the Member States may conclude future investment agreements with
third states.
2. The Colonia Protocol
a. Scope of Application
The Colonia Protocol applies to any dispute concerning its provisions
between an investor of one Member State, and the Member State in the
territory of which the investment was made, or the Host Member State. 33
Such disputes are known as "investment disputes."
b. Substantive Protections
In a manner similar to many recent bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
and multilateral investment treaties (MITs) (e.g., NAFTA, ch. 11), the
Colonia Protocol refers to both general and specific standards of treat-
ment of investments to which the State Parties must adhere. General
standards include fair and equitable treatment of investments, full protec-
tion of investments, prohibition of unjustified or arbitrary measures that
affect investments, and national and most-favoured-nation treatment of
investments. Specific standards of treatment concern the prohibition of
expropriation or nationalisation of investments except under certain con-
ditions, compensation for losses due to armed conflict or civil distur-
bance, unrestricted transfer of sums in relation to investments, and
30. Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
in MIERCOSUR, Jan. 17, 1994, available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/inter/
mercosul/coloni-e.asp [hereinafter Colonia Protocol].
31. Protocol on Promotion and Protection of Investment Proceeding from Non-Mem-
ber Countries of the MERCOSUR, Aug. 5, 1994, available at http://www.cvm.gov.
br/ingl/inter/mercosul/buenos-e.asp [hereinafter Buenos Aires Protocol].
32. See INTERNATIONAL ARBrTRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 10, for a more
detailed insight into the Colonia and Buenos Aires Protocols.
33. The terms "investment" and "investor" are defined in article 1, and the term "ter-
ritory" is defined in article 9.4 of the Colonia Protocol. These definitions are simi-
lar, although not identical, to those that can be found in most BITs. Colonia
Protocol, supra note 30, art. 9.4.
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recognition of subrogation due to the operation of investment insurance
arrangements.
c. Dispute Resolution Provisions
The Colonia Protocol also follows the pattern of recent BITs and MITs
by providing that investment disputes that cannot be resolved amicably
be settled by means of binding international arbitration. Article 9, the
dispute resolution clause of the Protocol, provides for a multi-tier dispute
resolution mechanism:
" Any investment dispute shall, to the extent possible, be resolved
through amicable consultations.
" If the parties cannot settle the investment dispute within six
months, it shall be submitted (at the request of the investor) to:
" the competent court of the Host Member State; or
o international arbitration; or
o the permanent system of settlement of disputes with private par-
ties which will eventually be established within the framework of
the Treaty of Asunci6n.34
" The choice of one of these three procedures shall be final.
" If the investor chooses to submit the dispute to international arbi-
tration, it has the choice of the following fora:
o arbitration under the auspices of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), either under the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and N'Itionals of other States (ICSID Convention) 35 when
each State Party to the Protocol has adhered to such Conven-
tion, or, when this condition is not met, under the ICSID Addi-
tional Facility Rules; or
" ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules.
Thus, if the investor has not achieved settlement of a dispute six
months after providing notice thereof to the Host Member State, the in-
vestor can submit the dispute to arbitration under the ICSID Convention,
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL Rules.
Although this choice of forum provision is not unlike those contained
in most BITs and MITs, one (unfortunate) distinguishing point bears not-
ing. The provision contains a phrase that reads as a condition precedent
for submitting disputes to arbitration under the ICSID Convention. This
arbitration forum would only be available when each State Party to the
present Protocol has adhered to such Convention.36 This phrase poses an
important gap in the availability of ICSID arbitration, given that not all
of the Member States are yet Contracting States to the ICSID
Convention.
34. This system has not yet been established.
35. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nation-
als of Other States (1965), available at http://www.jurisint.org/pub/01/en/doc/105_1.
htm (last visited July 16, 2003) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
36. Colonia Protocol, supra note 30, art. 9.
2003] INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE MERCOSUR 455
Presently, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are ICSID Contracting
States, but Brazil is not. If the condition precedent of article 9 is strictly
interpreted, nationals of Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay with covered
investment disputes amongst themselves would not be eligible to submit
their investment disputes to arbitration under the ICSID Convention un-
less, and until, Brazil also becomes an ICSID Contracting State, despite
there being no Brazilian connection. Nor would these states be eligible to
use the ICSID Additional Facility, which is only available when one party
is a non-ICSID Contracting State. Only arbitration under the UNCI-
TRAL Rules would be available.
In contrast, Argentine, Paraguayan, or Uruguayan nationals who make
investments in Brazil, although ineligible to submit their investment dis-
putes with Brazil to arbitration under the ICSID Convention, would be
able to submit them to the ICSID Additional Facility or arbitration under
the UNCITRAL Rules. The same would be true of Brazilian nationals
who make investments in Argentina, Paraguay, or Uruguay.
Until Brazil becomes an ICSID Contracting State, arbitration before
ICSID under the Colonia Protocol would consequently be limited to Ad-
ditional Facility arbitration of covered disputes involving either Brazil or
Brazilian nationals.
d. The Applicable Law
Article 9.5 of the Colonia Protocol provides that the arbitral tribunal
shall decide thz dispute on the basis of the provisions of the Protocol; the
law of the Host Member State, including its rules concerning conflicts of
law; the terms of any particular agreements entered into with regard to
the investment; as well as the applicable principles of international law.
While this provision incorporates the elements of applicable law that
would operate in the absence of agreement of the parties under article
42(1) of the ICSID Convention, it contains an additional element of ap-
plicable law; namely, the terms of any particular agreements entered into
with regard to the investment.37 The inclusion of this element should not
be interpreted as an attempt to broaden the scope of application of the
Protocol to cover purely contractual disputes. Article 9 of the Protocol
clearly states that it applies to disputes concerning the provisions of the
substantive protections of the Protocol. Thus, only disputes within this
category will be decided in accordance with the elements of applicable
law set forth in article 9.5.
e. The Award
Article 9.6 of the Colonia Protocol provides that arbitral awards shall
be final and binding on the parties to the dispute and that each Member
State shall enforce them "in accordance with its legislation. '38
37. Id. art. 9.5.
38. Id. art. 9.6.
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Member States doubtfully intended, by means of this formulation, to
derogate from their obligations to recognise and enforce arbitral awards
under other. applicable treaties. One such treaty is the ICSID Conven-
tion, article 54 of which provides that each ICSID Contracting State
"shall recognise an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as bind-
ing and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within
its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State."'39 Two
other such treaties are the New York Convention and the Panama Con-
vention, referred to above, which provide strictly limited grounds on
which the contracting parties can refuse the recognition and enforcement
of an arbitral award. All Member States are contracting parties to both
the New York and Panama Conventions, which should be applicable to
the recognition and enforcement of any award rendered under the ICSID
Additional Facility or the UNCITRAL Rules.
3. The Buenos Aires Protocol
a. Scope of Application
The Buenos Aires Protocol is meant to complement the Colonia Proto-
col by setting forth standards of treatment applicable to investments of
investors from non-Member States.40 The preamble of the Buenos Aires
Protocol emphasises the need to harmonise the general legal principles to
be applied by each of the State Parties [to the Protocol] to the invest-
ments originating in States not party to MERCOSUR (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Third States), so as not to create differentiated conditions
that distort the flow of investments. 41
b. Substantive Protections
Article 1 of the Buenos Aires Protocol provides that the States Parties
commit themselves to grant to investments made by investors of Third
States, treatment no more favourable than that established in the present
Protocol.4 2 Article 2 of the Protocol then sets forth the various standards
of treatment to be granted to such investments.
From the text and context of the Buenos Aires Protocol, it appears that
its object and purpose are to establish maximum standards of treatment
to be granted to investors from Third States in treaties for the promotion
and protection of investments concluded by each Member State with such
Third States. Thus, the introductory phrase of article 2 provides that "the
general treatment to be agreed to by each State Party [to the Protocol]
with Third States shall not recognise benefits and rights to the latter
which are greater than those recognised to the investor on the following
39. ICSID Convention, supra note 35, art. 54.
40. These standards also apply to the Associate States Chile and Bolivia, which are not
parties to either the Colonia Protocol or the Buenos Aires Protocol.
41. Buenos Aires Protocol, supra note 31.
42. Id. art. 1.
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normative bases. '43 Similarly, article 2(I), concerning the investments
and disputes covered by the Protocol, refers to the application of the
"norms of the agreements to be concluded."44 Article 3 of the Protocol
provides for consultation between the Member States with regard to cur-
rent and future negotiations of investment treaties by each Member State
with Third States, particularly in the event of a substantive departure
from the standards of the Protocol.
c. Dispute Resolution Provisions
Similarly, the provisions on dispute resolution in article 2(H) of the
Protocol constitute a general framework rather than being specific in na-
ture. These provisions, which apply to any dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of an agreement on the promotion and reciprocal
protection of investments that arises between an investor of a Third State
and a State Party, foresee a multi-tier approach to dispute resolution sim-
ilar to, but less detailed than, that provided in the Colonia Protocol:
" Any investment dispute arising under the Protocol shall, to the ex-
tent possible, be resolved through amicable consultations.
" If the parties cannot settle the investment dispute within a reason-
able time, it shall be submitted (at the request of the investor) to:
o the competent court of the Host Member State; or
o international arbitration;
" The choice of one of these three procedures shall be final.
" If the investor chooses to submit the dispute to international arbi-
tration it has the choice of ad hoc or institutional arbitration (no
specific rules or institutions are mentioned). 45
4. Ambitions of the Protocols
The Colonia Protocol follows a well-established pattern of BITs and
MITs that provide for the promotion and protection of foreign invest-
ment on a global level. This protocol also complements a growing net-
work of BITs by and among the individual Member States themselves
(which will be addressed briefly below). The Colonia Protocol is a mod-
em instrument that aims to provide investors in the region with real and
effective protection against unlawful action by the Host Member States. 46
By contract, the Buenos Aires Protocol is a novel legal instrument, set-
ting forth the parameters within which Member States commit them-
selves to negotiate future investment agreements with Third States. The
combined aim of the Colonia and Buenos Aires Protocols is that, once in
43. Id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
44. Id. art. 2(l) (emphasis added).
45. Id. art. 2(H).
46. The Preamble to the Colonia Protocol states, inter alia, that the parties are "con-
vinced that the creation of favourable conditions for the investment of investors of
one of the Contracting Parties in the territory of another Contracting Party will
intensify the economic cooperation and will speed up the process of integration
between the four countries." Colonia Protocol, supra note 30.
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force, they will establish a modem and harmonised legal framework for
investor-state arbitration within MERCOSUR.
III. THE REALITY - INDIVIDUAL APPROACHES,
INDEPENDENT SOLUTIONS
A. OVERVIEW
The MAA and the Colonia and Buenos Aires Protocols constitute at-
tempts to revolutionise and harmonise, on a regional rather than an indi-
vidual national level, international arbitration mechanisms (both
commercial and investor-state) in the MERCOSUR Member and Associ-
ate States.
The reality of how these harmonised mechanisms will function (assum-
ing that they are all eventually ratified) is another matter, particularly in
light of (i) the lack of coherence and clarity of parts of the text of the
agreements and (ii) the confusing parallelism with the other international
conventions entered into by the individual Member and Associate States,
not to mention the national arbitration laws and practice of those states.
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief overview of the ap-
proach adopted by the individual Member and Associate States in their
movement towards (a) modernising their own national arbitration laws
(i.e., have they adopted a new and modern arbitration law based on the
UNCITRAL Model Law) and arbitration practice; and (b) implementing
important international arbitration conventions (i.e., the Panama Con-
vention, the New York Convention, the ICSID Convention, and BITs
with third states).
This approach has been far from uniform. As could be expected, given
a history of isolation and detachment, each state has reacted differently
to the pressure to modernise and provide effective dispute resolution
mechanisms for foreign investment. The tangible results of this arbitra-
tion drive can be reduced to tabular form.
Member/ Adoption of Accession Accession Accession BITS
Associate UNCrTRAL to Panama to New York to ICSID in Force
State Model Law Convention Convention Convention by 2000
Argentina Imminent Nov. 1994 Mar. 1989 Oct. 1994 43
Brazil No, but new law in Aug. 1995 July 2002 - -
1996
Paraguay Apr. 2002 Dec. 1976 Oct. 1997 Feb. 1983 15
Uruguay - Mar. 1977 Mar. 1983 Sept. 2000 13
Bolivia Adopted 1997 - Apr. 1995 July 1995 15
Chile In progress Apr. 1976 Sept. 1975 Oct. 1991 22
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B. INDIVIDUAL APPROACHES
In this section, we will first focus on the approaches to arbitration
adopted by Argentina and Brazil, the largest of the Member and Associ-
ate States. A review of tangible arbitration progress (such as enactment
of new legislation and accession to international conventions) in each
state is not sufficient without a parallel consideration of the attitude of
the local judiciary in its application of those laws and conventions. A law
or convention is only as good as the judges called upon to implement and
support it. That said we will also take a quick look at the more tangible
steps taken by Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Chile in adopting new
laws.
1. Argentina
a. Background and Practice of Arbitration in Argentina
Argentine legislation referring to arbitration dates back to an 1812 Or-
dinance of Justice. Arbitration proceedings were first regulated in the
Code of Procedure of 1880. This antiquated code is still applicable to
arbitrations in Argentina.
For most of the previous century, decisions by Argentine courts con-
cerning arbitrations taking place in Argentina were erratic and inconsis-
tent (although not necessarily hostile to arbitration). This uncertainty
discouraged the use of arbitration for many decades. More recently,
however, in the context of a substantially different political and economic
scenario, and despite the fact that all attempts to reform the arbitration
legislation itself have failed (or perhaps because of it), Argentine courts
have been reversing the above pattern through a number of decisions
consistently reflecting a more favourable attitude towards arbitration.
The official statistics provided by the ICC reveal that Argentina and Mex-
ico are the Latin American states most active in international arbitrations
under the ICC rules.
b. Overview of Arbitration Legislation in Argentina 47
A new and modern arbitration law, approved by the Senate in Novem-
ber 2002, is currently before Congress and could be enacted in a matter of
weeks. Until this law is enacted, however, arbitration proceedings in Ar-
gentina continue to be governed principally by the nineteenth century
National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (Code). Articles 736-
772 of the Code govern arbitration proceedings seated in Buenos Aires,
where the vast majority of domestic and international arbitrations take
place. These provisions, apart from some minor amendments, have not
changed since their enactment in 1880. Some of the most inadequate pro-
visions of Argentina's current arbitration legislation are as follows:
47. See INTERNATIONAL ARBrRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 10, Ch. 2, for a
more detailed insight into arbitration in Argentina.
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" No distinction is made between domestic and international
arbitration.
" No express reference is made to the autonomy of the arbitration
agreement.
* The principle of comp6tence-compdtence (i.e., the arbitral tribunal
is competent to determine its own jurisdiction) is not expressly
contemplated.
" The power of the arbitral tribunal (rather than the courts) to de-
termine issues of arbitrability is not expressly contemplated.
" The power of the arbitral tribunal to order interim measures of
protection is not addressed.
" Both a cldusula compromisoria (agreement to submit a future dis-
pute to arbitration) and a compromiso (agreement to submit an
existing dispute to arbitration) are required. The arbitration
agreement is not operative until the dispute has arisen and the
compromiso has been executed.
" A de iure arbitral award is subject to all the means of recourse
available against a court judgment, including a full appeal on the
merits (although the right of appeal may be excluded or limited by
agreement of the parties, which would include exclusion pursuant
to institutional rules such as those of the ICC).
c. Overview of the Application of Arbitration Legislation by the
Argentine Courts
The limitations of the existing legislation were noted in the landmark
decision rendered in 1989 by the Buenos Aires Commercial Court of Ap-
peals in the Welbers case.48 On that occasion, in an international arbitra-
tion due to take place in Buenos Aires, the court observed that certain
provisions of the Code were "relatively inadequate for international arbi-
tration proceedings" and then made a ruling on the basis of the interna-
tionally recognised principles and provisions of the UNCITRAL Model
Law.4
9
In fact, a series of decisions of the Argentine courts has gone a long
way to redress the limitations of Argentina's arbitration legislation, miti-
gating the most important criticisms listed above. For example, the Bue-
nos Aires Commercial Court of Appeals has in more than one case drawn
a clear line between domestic and international arbitration. In the
Welbers case, for instance, this court held that although national courts
retain powers of supervision over arbitral proceedings, these powers must
be exercised with extreme caution in the case of international arbitra-
tions.50 Similarly, the principle of autonomy of the arbitration agreement
was recognised by the Argentine Supreme Court as early as 1918 in the
Otto Frank case,51 and more recently by the Buenos Aires Commercial
Court of Appeal in the Welbers case.
48. Welbers SA v. Extraktionstechnick Gesellschaft Fur Anlagenbau, CNCom. [1989-
El L.L. 302 (1989).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Otto Frank v. Provincia de Buenos Aires, CSJN, 128 Fallos 402 (1918).
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Regarding the issue of competence-competence, in 1926 the Buenos
Aires Commercial Court of Appeals in the Romero case disregarded the
provisions of the Code, holding that it was not up to a national court to
decide what issues should be included in the compromiso because this
would intrude on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, which includes
the power to decide its own jurisdiction.52 Although most subsequent
judicial decisions have followed the same line of reasoning, unfortunately,
there have also been some decisions to the contrary. 5 3
d. The New Draft Arbitration Law in Argentina
In 1991, an ad hoc committee was first entrusted with the task of draft-
ing a new law on arbitration in Argentina. Following several unsuccessful
drafts, in 2001 a new draft arbitration law applicable to both domestic and
international proceedings in Buenos Aires was submitted to the Senate.
This proposed new law is modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law, but
regulates in more detail certain topics such as the arbitration agreement
and evidence. The proposed law also tackles other aspects of modern
arbitration, such as multi-party arbitration and consolidation of arbitra-
tion proceedings.
This draft arbitration law was approved by the Senate and communi-
cated to the President on November 28, 2002. The draft law is currently
before the Argentine Congress (Cdmara de Diputados) and will hopefully
be enacted by the end of July 2003. The enactment of the new law would
bring about a welcome codification of the Argentine courts' valiant at-
tempts to modernise the practice of international arbitration in Argen-
tina. Its enactment would be especially welcome at this juncture, given
that the MERCOSUR International Commercial Arbitration Agreement
(MAA, discussed in Part II, which is also loosely modelled on the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law) shall enter into force in Argentina on July 5, 2003,
following ratification by Brazil. Modernised arbitration norms across the
board would be vastly preferable to a two-track system in which interna-
tional arbitrations falling under the MAA benefit from the modern laws,
whereas all others are governed by the outdated Argentine Code.
e. Argentina's Accession to International Arbitration Conventions
Article 31 of the Argentine Constitution recognises the supremacy of
international treaties over internal legislation. This is important for inter-
national arbitration proceedings seated in Argentina given Argentina's
accession to various international conventions on the subject, principally
the New York Convention, the Panama Convention, and the MAA. Ar-
52. Romero v. Romero y Cfa., [22-VI] J.A. 1177 (1926).
53. As recently as 1989, the Argentine Supreme Court held that when the validity of
the main contract had been questioned, a decision on the validity of the arbitration
agreement which forms part of that main contract can only be rendered by na-
tional courts. Nidera Argentina v. Rodriguez Alvarez de Canale, CSJN [1990-A]
L.L. 419 (1989).
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gentina is also a party to the Montevideo Convention and the Las Lefias
Protocol, discussed above.
Argentina became a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention in
1994 and has entered into one of the widest networks of BITs in Latin
America. By 2000, Argentina had signed a prolific fifty-three BITs, and
ratified fourty-three of them. This highly developed network of BITs,
most of which grant aggrieved investors direct access to international ar-
bitration, is proving to be a popular recourse for foreign investors in Ar-
gentina. For example, a total of twenty ICSID arbitrations have been
registered against Argentina by foreign investors on grounds of alleged
violations of substantive obligations under BITs.54 Fourteen of these ar-
bitrations were registered by ICSID in the last two years, the majority as
a result of the economic crisis. But the treaties work both ways, and one
Argentine investor recently brought, and won, ICSID proceedings
against Spain on grounds of breach of the provisions of the Argentina-
Spain BIT.55
2. Brazil
a. Background and Practice of Arbitration in Brazil
Brazilian legislation referring to arbitration also dates back a long way,
to the Emperor Dom Pedro's Constitution of 1824. In practice, however,
arbitration was disregarded as a method of dispute resolution in Brazil,
winning Brazil the dubious accolade of being "one of the last il6ts de
resistance to international commercial arbitration. ' 56
In the 1980s, certain efforts largely driven by academics and scholars
were made to reverse this negative attitude towards arbitration. Three
new bills on the subject were even prepared but never forwarded to the
National Congress. 57 Real progress was not made until the 1990s. In
1995, Brazil took the first important step of ratifying the Panama Conven-
tion. In 1996, largely as a result of the valiant efforts of then-Senator
Marco Mariel, the National Congress enacted a new arbitration law (1996
Law). Brazil's legislators chose not to adopt the UNCITRAL Model
Law in 1996, but instead conceived a "Brazilianised" adaptation, which
was nevertheless an important development.
Soon after publication of the 1996 Law, but prior to its entry into force,
the new Law became the object of a constitutional challenge in the Bra-
zilian Supreme Court.58 The challenge was sponsored by Justice
54. A complete list of concluded and pending cases before ICSID is available on
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/main.htm (last visited July 20, 2003).
55. Emilio Agustn Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (Oct.
28, 1999).
56. RENE DAVID, L'ARBrrRAGE DANs LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 233-34 (1982).
57. See Pedro Batista Martins, Arbitration in Brazil: Highlight and the View of the
Judiciary (2003) (paper presented at the First Annual Miami International Arbi-
tration Conference in Jan. 2003).
58. See, e.g., F.W. Lacerda Dantas, Arbitragem - Consideraf6es sobre a constitucion-
alidade da Lei 9307/96, 86 REVISTA DOs TRmUNAis 741 (1997).
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Pertence, who based his position on article 5, XXXV, of the Brazilian
Federal Constitution: "The law cannot exclude from the consideration of
the Judiciary any damage or threat to a right. '59 This constitutional chal-
lenge sparked a lengthy and heated debate, and the fate of arbitration in
Brazil hung dangerously in the balance. 60 The debate was finally re-
solved by a majority decision of the Supreme Court in December 2001 in
favour of the constitutionality of the new Law. This decision was fol-
lowed by the ratification in July 2002 of the New York Convention. Bra-
zil was no longer the black sheep of the international arbitration
community.
These steps may not be enough to convert Brazil overnight into a ha-
ven for arbitration, but Brazil has gone a long way to redress the previous
hostility that made well-advised contract drafters resolutely avoid the
country as a seat for arbitration.
b. Overview of Arbitration Legislation in Brazil
Brazil's new arbitration law (Law No. 9307) was published on Septem-
ber 24, 1996, and replaced the provisions of the Brazilian Code of Civil
Procedure dealing with arbitration.61 The 1996 Law was inspired by vari-
ous international arbitration instruments: the UNCITRAL Model Law,
the Spanish Arbitration Act of 1988, the New York Convention, and the
Panama Convention.62 To these inspirations, the legislators added a twist
of "Brazilianisation," resulting in a perhaps impractical hybrid of tradi-
tional protectionism and quasi-modern thinking. We do not propose to
review the 1996 Law in detail,63 but the following are a selection of its
most important highlights and drawbacks.
TR HiGLIGHT.
" Before the 1996 Law, an arbitration clause was considered as a
mere pactum in contrahendo, and its non-execution only entitled a
party to damages. Article 4 of the new Law protects the validity
and the enforceability of the arbitration clause.
* Article 8 of the 1996 Law establishes the autonomy of the arbitra-
tion clause, and provides that the arbitrator can rule on his own
jurisdiction (competence- competence).
" Under article 41 of the 1996 Law the national courts are required
to dismiss a claim if a party invokes an arbitration clause.
" Article 21 of the 1996 Law permits the parties to choose freely the
applicable procedural rules, either by referring to a set of institu-
tional rules or by establishing detailed ad hoc rules.
59. C.F., art. 5, XXXV (1993).
60. See Nigel Blackaby, Arbitration and Brazil: A Foreign Perspective, 17 ARB. INT'L
129 (2001), for an English language discussion of the issues.
61. FED. OmcIAL GAZETTE, Sept. 24, 1996, at 18,897-900.
62. C.A. Carmona, Arbitragem no Brasil: em busca de uma nova lei, 72 REviSTA DE
PROCEssO 53, 57 (1993).
63. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 10, Ch. 3, for a
more detailed insight on the 1996 Law.
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* Article 28 of the 1996 Law provides for the possibility of a settle-
ment, which has the same effects as an arbitral award (such as a
consent award).
" Article 34 of the 1996 Law supports the principle of the supremacy
of international treaty provisions. Thus, foreign arbitral awards
shall be enforced and recognised in accordance with the interna-
tional treaties that Brazil has ratified (inter alia the New York
Convention, ratified in July 2002).
" Double exequatur of arbitral awards is no longer required (articles
38 and 39).
THE DRAWBACKS.
" Unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law, the 1996 Law does not differ-
entiate domestic arbitration and international arbitration.
" Under the 1996 Law, the arbitration clause itself is not necessarily
sufficient to initiate the arbitration. 64 If the arbitration clause con-
tains a mechanism to constitute the arbitral tribunal, which it may
do by reference to a set of institutional rules (a "full" arbitration
clause), it will be sufficient to commence arbitration; if no such
mechanism is provided (an "empty" arbitration clause) a com-
promisso (submission agreement) will be necessary. 65
" This obligation to conclude a compromisso goes against the princi-
ple of "compdtence-comp~tence." In the event of a disagreement
between the parties, the national courts will be called upon to de-
cide the contents of the compromisso (article 7). Thus the courts
will decide whether the dispute falls within the scope of the arbi-
tration clause, and consequently, whether the arbitrators are com-
petent to entertain the dispute.66
" The survival of the compromisso corrupts other parts of the 1996
Law, which refers several times to the compromisso instead of the
arbitration agreement (e.g., articles 16 and 32(1)). Subsequent
case law must interpret these apparent contradictions.
" A foreign arbitral award has to be approved in order to be en-
forceable in Brazil. The 1996 Law asserts the competence of the
Supreme Court for the homologation of the arbitral award, and
establishes the conditions for this approval. This homologation
appears to run contrary to the New York Convention, recently rat-
ified by Brazil. This contradiction has sparked a lively debate
among scholars in Brazil, which seems to turn on whether the com-
petence of the Supreme Court in the homologation procedure is
established by the Brazilian Constitution. 67
64. Carmona, supra note 62, at 59.
65. See J. B. Lee, Le nouveau rdgime d'arbirage au Brgsil, Rv. ARM. 1999 (1997).
The difference between a "full" arbitration clause and an "empty" arbitration
clause was consecrated by a recent judgment by Sdo Paulo's Court of Justice, TJ/
SP, Agravo de Instrumento n' 124.217.4/0, Sept. 16, 1999.
66. Lee, supra note 65.
67. The Supreme Court is competent to grant the homologation of "foreign judg-
ments" but, for a view that this includes foreign arbitral awards. See Martins,
supra note 57.
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- Although the grounds for refusal to recognise and enforce arbitral
awards (and conditions to obtain homologation) under the 1996
Law are based on the New York Convention (article 38), the new
Law has not unified them with the grounds for annulment or set-
ting aside of an award (article 32), which could lead to articulation
problems.
c. The Reaction of the Brazilian Courts to the 1996 Law
The Brazilian courts' attitude with regard to the 1996 Law is still un-
foreseeable, although the fact that the majority of the Supreme Court
voted in favour of the constitutionality of the new Law sends a strong
signal to other courts that arbitration is to be supported. The 1996 Law
limits the intervention of the national courts, but they still maintain an
important role, notably in the enforcement of the arbitration clause,
granting of interim measures, decision of applications for annulment of
the arbitral award, and the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral
award. The assistance of the national courts is therefore critical for the
implementation of the 1996 Law and the development of arbitration in
general. Given the absence of an arbitration tradition in Brazil, some
fluctuations in future judicial decisions are to be expected.
d. Brazil's Accession to International Arbitration Conventions
Brazil acceded to the Panama Convention in 1995 and ratified the New
York Convention in July 2002. Brazil is also a party to the Montevideo
Convention and the Las Lefias Protocol. As noted above, Brazil ratified
the MAA on June 5, 2003; consequently, this agreement should come into
force in both Brazil and Argentina on July 5, 2003. Discrepancies clearly
exist between the provisions of the MAA and Brazil's 1996 Law. As with
Argentina, this two-track arbitration system is not ideal.
Brazil has yet to become a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention,
or ratify any of the fourteen BITs it had signed by 2000. We understand
that there is no current move to advance ratification, which is possibly a
result of the recent flurry of claims against Brazil's neighbour.
3. Paraguay
In terms of the "tangible" trappings of an arbitration-friendly nation,
Paraguay displays an exemplary spirit. Paraguay is the only Member
State to have enacted a new arbitration law adopting the UNCITRAL
Model Law. The new Law, which was heralded as "an international norm
encompassing the most advanced trends in the area, which seeks to con-
vert Paraguay into an important arbitration centre on both the national
and international level," 68 came into force in April 2002. Obviously,
68. Mr. Jose Felix Fernandez Estigarribia, the Senator who was responsible for the
introduction of the draft arbitration law, described it as providing "un marco legal
adecuado para el desarrollo del arbitraje, tanto el nacional como el internacional,
al igual que el institucional y el independiente adoptando los principios y solu-
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there is still little, if any, indication of how the Paraguayan courts will
react to this new arbitration Law. In the last ten years, Paraguay has not
been the seat of any ICC arbitration; this may change with the adoption
of the new law.
In terms of international conventions, Paraguay acceded to the Panama
Convention in 1976, followed by the New York Convention in 1997. It is
also a party to the Montevideo Convention and the Las Lefias Protocol.
Paraguay became a Contracting State to the ICSID Convention as early
as 1983 (the earliest of the Member and Associate States), and by 2000
had signed twenty-three BITs, fifteen of which were in force at that time.
Paraguay has been a defendant in only one ICSID arbitration, filed by a
Peruvian national under the BIT between Peru and Paraguay.69
4. Uruguay
Uruguay has not enacted a new arbitration law adopting the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law, and instead relies on the rather more antiquated arbi-
tration provisions of its General Code of Procedure (which, like the
Argentine Code, calls for the two-step procedure of arbitration agree-
ment and compromiso). The provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law
are of interpretive value only (doctrina mds recibida), applying where
Uruguayan legislation does not specifically regulate any aspect of the ar-
bitral procedure. 70 Uruguay has, however, been the seat of three ICC
arbitrations in the last ten years.
Uruguay was among the first of the Member and Associate States to
accede to the Panama Convention (1977) and the New York Convention
(1983). Uraguay is also a party to the Montevideo Convention and the
Las Lefias Protocol. Uruguay became a Contracting State to the ICSID
Convention in 2000, having signed twenty-four BITs and ratified thirteen
of them by that time. No ICSID arbitrations have yet been registered
against Uruguay.
5. Bolivia
Bolivia has a relatively new arbitration law, Law 1770 of March 10,
1997, which is loosely based on the UNCITRAL Model Law (although it
ciones contenidos en la Ley Modelo de la Comisi6n de la Naciones Unidas para el
Derecho Mercantil Internacional (CNUDMI) [i.e., UNCITRAL]. El proyecto
constituye asf una norma internacional con soluciones que son consideradas acept-
ables para partes de Estados y ordenamientos jurfdicos diferentes. El Proyecto
recoge las tendencias m~is avanzadas en la materia, buscando posibilitar que el
Paraguay se constituya en un importante centro de arbitraje a nivel internacional y
regional, habida cuenta de su situaci6n geogrdfica estrat6gica en el centro del Mer-
cado Comtin del Sur (MERCOSUR)." Jose Felix Fernandez Estigarribia,
Proyecto de Ley de Medios de Resolucion de Conflictos, Presentation at the Ex-
posicion de Motivos, at http://www.camparaguay.com/descargar/ley.doc (last vis-
ited Sept. 2, 2003).
69. Eudoro A. Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5 (Aug. 8,
2000).
70. The authors would like to thank Juan Carlos Blanco of Pdrez del Castillo-Navarro-
Inciarte-Gari for this insight into the applicable arbitration legislation in Uruguay.
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runs to ninety-eight articles). This law was a step towards modernising
Bolivia's previous legislation. Unfortunately, a new law is currently
under discussion in Bolivia that would distance the 1997 law from the
Model Law. 71 Bolivia has been the seat of one ICC arbitration in the last
ten years, which took place under the 1997 arbitration law.
In 1995, Bolivia took two important steps in the international arena:
having not even acceded to the Panama Convention, it ratified both the
New York Convention and the ICSID Convention within three months.
By 2000 Bolivia had signed twenty BITs and ratified three quarters of
them. One ICSID arbitration has been registered against Bolivia, filed
under the BIT in force between Bolivia and the Netherlands. 72
6. Chile
A draft new arbitration law based on the UNCITRAL Model Law,
prepared by the Santiago Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the Santi-
ago Chamber of Commerce and the American Chamber of Commerce
Arbitration Centre in Santiago, is currently before the Chilean Congress.
This proposed law would replace Chile's current outdated nineteenth
century arbitration legislation. The fact that Chile (a large economy with
substantial foreign investment) has been the seat of only one ICC arbitra-
tion in the last ten years (as compared to Argentina's eighteen) is perhaps
an indication of the change needed.
Chile, however, has shown a modern approach to the enforcement of
foreign arbitration awards, being the first of the Member and Associate
States to accede to both the New York and Panama Conventions in 1975
and 1976 respectively. A relatively early Contracting Party to the ICSID
Convention (1991), Chile had signed an impressive forty-five BITs by
2000, and ratified twenty-two of them. Chile has been a defendant in two
ICSID arbitrations brought under those BITs.73
As can be seen from the steps taken by the Member and Associate
States to reform and modemise their arbitration regimes, the approaches
taken by the six countries have been quite different. Although each
country has awoken to the benefits of nurturing arbitration as part of the
legal framework to attract foreign investors, they have done so at differ-
ent times, to different degrees, using different tools, and eliciting different
reactions from their respective judiciaries. Against this background, the
idea of harmonising arbitration mechanisms across the MERCOSUR re-
gion was clearly an ambitious one.
71. The authors would like to thank Ramiro Guevara, of Guevara & Gutidrrez S.C.,
for this insight into the current status of arbitration legislation in Bolivia.
72. Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (Feb. 25,
2002).
73. Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, ICSID
Case No. ARB/98/2; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/7.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
At the beginning of this article we set out to review arbitration mecha-
nisms (i) under the MERCOSUR agreements and protocols and (ii) in
the individual Member and Associate States, posing the question: "Is
harmonisation the solution?" The answer, we submit, is no.
The MAA contains important flaws in drafting and scope, particularly
in respect of the recognition and enforcement of the award, which could
prove more confusing than harmonising. This confusion is principally
caused by (a) the plethora of parallel arbitration conventions already ex-
isting in respect of the same subject matter (the Panama Convention, the
New York Convention, the Montevideo Convention, and the Las Lefias
Protocol); and (b) the failure of the MAA to provide for an order of
preference for the application of these conventions. The Las Lefias Pro-
tocol (which seeks to establish its own supremacy) and the Montevideo
Convention are unsuitable for international arbitration. Rather than
solve this problem of priority, the MAA simply adds another convention
to the pile. Similarly, the rules applicable to the arbitration procedure set
forth in the MAA (which are loosely based on the UNCITRAL Rules),
when set against the national arbitration legislation of each of the individ-
ual states and added to the IACAC rules already in existence in the re-
gion, further complicate matters. Now that the MAA is entering into
force in Argentina and Brazil, the reality of how this plethora of rules and
conventions will interact needs to be addressed.
The need for some order in these overlapping arbitration mechanisms
becomes painfully obvious when a potential real-life scenario is analysed.
For instance, a dispute arises relating to a contract between a Brazilian
corporation and an Argentine corporation that contains a clause provid-
ing for arbitration in Buenos Aires, but specifying no arbitration rules.
Given that the parties are domiciled in different Member States that have
both ratified the MAA, the first question is whether the MAA or the
Argentine arbitration law (the Code) governs the proceedings. Although
prima facie, the MAA should govern the proceedings and any an uncoop-
erative party could dispute this in the Argentine courts. As the parties
did not select any procedural rules in their agreement, the IACAC rules
would apply. The Arbitrator Nominating Committee of the IACAC
would consequently be available to assist in the appointment and replace-
ment of the arbitrators. If at the end of the process the arbitrators find in
favour of the Brazilian party, and the Brazilian party seeks to enforce the
arbitral award against the Argentine party's assets in Uruguay, pursuant
to which legal norms should the Brazilian party make its application: the
New York Convention, the Panama Convention, the Montevideo Con-
vention, or the Las Lefias Protocol? All deal with the question of the
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award and all are in force in Uruguay.
In sum, rather than attempting to harmonise the already existing com-
mercial arbitration mechanisms by means of yet another arbitral conven-
tion, we believe that the Member and Associate States of MERCOSUR
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would have done better simply to enact new national arbitration laws
adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law (as Paraguay has done) and con-
firm their commitment to the New York Convention (in preference to the
other arbitration conventions on the same subject they have ratified). 74
The same can be said for the agreements dealing with investor-state
arbitration in the region. The Colonia Protocol, as drafted, will not per-
mit investors in the MERCOSUR region to have recourse to arbitration
under the ICSID Convention unless and until Brazil becomes a Con-
tracting State. The recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award ren-
dered in an ICSID Additional Facility or UNCITRAL arbitration suffers
from the same ambiguities as a commercial arbitral award in terms of the
rules applicable. To put it simply, if the Colonia Protocol came into force,
an investor with a choice of arbitration pursuant to the Protocol or a BIT
providing for arbitration under the ICSID Convention would be better
advised to commence arbitration pursuant to the BIT.
Given the different approaches of the Member States to investor-state
arbitration (particularly Brazil's approach, having failed to ratify any
BITs) we believe that the harmonisation attempt contained in the
Colonia Protocol was again too ambitious. It would have been simpler if
the Member States had proceeded at their own pace to sign and ratify
BITs with each other, and indeed with Third States, on individual bases.
The Buenos Aires Protocol adds little to the equation either way.
In summation, the construction of a solid edifice is not a function of the
number of bricks used, but the way in which the bricks are assembled.
The desire of the Member and Associate States of MERCOSUR to seek
the adoption of common solutions to the question of arbitration is a no-
ble one, but such solutions need to address clearly their scope of applica-
tion. Failure to do so will cause confusion that will continue to frustrate
the development of the region as a host to arbitration. Such failure will
also render the task of educating the judiciary much more complex. It is
perhaps time for the MERCOSUR states to issue a clear statement as to
how they envisage the co-existence of these structures.
74. "[11f the experience of a successful economic cooperation and integration scheme
spanning over more than forty years had been considered relevant, the example of
the European Union could have been followed. The New York Convention-and
not a specific European Union convention for the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards-has sufficed for permitting the expansion of commercial arbitra-
tion in that part of the world in a manner satisfactory to users, practitioners and
national courts alike." See Horacio Grigera Na6n, Recent Trends Regarding Com-
mercial Arbitration in Latin America, at 15 (paper presented at the 1998 Confer-
ence of the International Bar Association (IBA) in Vancouver).
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